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1. Introduction
“Immigrants are taking advantage of the system”. This belief is increasingly
shared in various developed countries. It is largely relayed by populist politi-
cians, who use popular fears in a context of rising unemployment and large
social protection deficit. If economists widely recognize the economic benefits
of migration in developed countries, the fear of an unsustainable burden com-
ing from large migration flows is strong. According to the World Value Survey
(2009), in the US, 55.4% of people consider that “employers should give priority
to American people over immigrants in the attribution of jobs ”. For Germans,
the British and Japanese, the rate is respectively 55.7%, 62.9% and 62.7%. In
this context, the attention has largely been focused on welfare benefits, social
protection and job security.
Concerning employment protection, popular wisdom sees migration as a
threat for job security. “Migrants damage job security”, the British newspa-
per The Telegraph announced in 2007.1 Some workers fear that migrants are
simply “stealing” their jobs. Hence in the context of an economic crisis, the jobs
attributed to immigrants are considered as substituting to native employment
rather than as being complementary. Despite the lack of economic foundations
for such an argument, extreme-right political parties use this very simple argu-
ment: “one immigrant means one unemployed native worker”. Another argu-
ment is that immigration may affect the quality of jobs. Employment protection
may also be attractive for migrants who are looking for protective legislation.
However , the effect of job protection is not straightforward. Immigrants are
indeed more likely to be “outsiders” in the labor market of their destination
country. And if the effects of employment protection on the level of aggregate
employment are ambiguous, its effects on the dynamic of job destruction and
creation are widely accepted. If employment protection slows down the transi-
tion between unemployment and employment, it may also reduce the capacity
of migrants to get a job. In other words, it is not proven that migrants look
for more protective employment legislation. This paper thus addresses the fol-
lowing question empirically : how does employment protection in source and
destination countries affect bilateral migration?
The economic literature largely explores the linkages between labor markets
and migration. Since Hicks (1932), the wage differential between the source and
destination country has been seen as a fundamental determinant of migration.
Several authors have focused more recently on the influence of immigration on
local labor markets. For instance , Borjas (1999) showed theoretically that
immigration should increase the national income and that the greater the dif-
ferences in productive endowments between immigrants and natives, the higher
the gains. Empirically, a large number of studies have tried to estimate the
119 Nov. 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1569800/Migrants-damage-
job-security-says-economist.html
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influence of immigration on wages using spatial correlation approaches (Borjas,
1983; Grossman, 1982; Borjas et al., 1997; Schoeni, 1997). Other authors have
tried to measure this effect through natural experiments such as in the influen-
tial paper by Card (1990) which measured the impact of “Mariel” immigration
flows from Cuba to Miami in September 1980. However, there is still no consen-
sus on the real effects of immigration. This literature also focuses on the social
implications of migration , but does not deal with the issue of the influence of
the social environment on migration. The latter effect has been explored by the
welfare migration literature (see Brueckner (2000) for an overview or De Giorgi
and Pellizzari (2009) for an analysis on welfare migration in Europe). Neverthe-
less, this literature mainly focuses on the influence of social expenditures and
not on labor market institutions as such. Razin et al. (2009) for instance show
that welfare state benefits have an adverse effect on the migrants’ skill composi-
tion. Concerning the effect of labor market institutions, Geis et al. (2008) found
in a microeconomic study that employment protection, union coverage and un-
employment benefits have a positive effect on migration. This study is, to the
best of our knowledge, the only one estimating the specific effect of EPL on mi-
gration. However, there are several limitations that we try to take into account
in our empirical strategy. First, the study neglects the influence of labor market
conditions in the country of origin. We argue that the employment protection
differential between the country of origin and of destination may be an impor-
tant factor of migration (and not only EPL in the destination country). Second,
authors use micro data which allow them to include individual characteristics
of migrants , but limit the destination choice to four receiving countries. In
our study, the geographical coverage has been extended to all OECD countries.
Third, their institutional variables may be correlated with other country char-
acteristics. For instance, their results may be driven by the correlation between
employment protection and migration policy. In our analysis, we exploit the
bilateral dimension of the database, allowing us to include destination country
fixed effects in order to control for unobserved country characteristics.
Our analysis makes a number of contributions to the literature. To the best
of our knowledge, it is the first analysis of the effects of employment protection
on migration using bilateral migration data. This allows us to consider the influ-
ence of employment protection in the country of destination and of origin. We
show that the employment protection differential is an important determinant
of migration.
We find that the differential of employment protection between source and
destination country has a strong, significant and negative impact on migration
, which contradicts the result of Geis et al. (2008). Contrary to popular wisdom
which assumes that migrants are looking for more protected markets, we show
that migrants tend to move to countries where employment protection is close
to that of their country of origin. This result, based on migration flows data
(OECD, 2010), is valid taking into account (1) the high occurrence of zero or
missing flows using Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimators and (2) a
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possible endogeneity bias using IV estimators. Relative preferences over wages
or employment, or a distinct impact on wages and employment may explain
these results. Then, by using a database on migration stock (Docquier and
Marfouk, 2004), we are also able to distinguish migration by skill level. We
show that the effects described above are stronger for high-skilled workers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines employment protection,
presents its measurement and provides a brief overview of its implementation in
the world. Section 3 presents the data used and the econometric issues. Section
4 presents the results for the determinants of migration flows and their selection
by educational level. Section 5 concludes.
2. Employment Protection in the World and its Economic Effects
2.1. Employment Protection: Measurement and Implementation in the World
Employment protection may be defined as follows : “Any set of regulations,
either legislated or written in labor contracts that limit the employer’s ability
to dismiss the workers without delay or cost” (Pissarides, 2001). The OECD
(1999) lists five types of employment protection: (1) administrative procedures,
(2) notice of termination , (3) severance payment, (4) difficulty of dismissal, and
(5) additional measures for collective dismissals.
Botero et al. (2004) propose a broader definition including (i) alternative
employment contracts, (ii) the cost of increasing hours worked, (iii) the cost
of firing workers, and (iv) dismissal procedures. They propose four subindexes
that are aggregated to get a consistent estimate of the strictness of employment
laws in 85 countries, including a significant proportion of developing countries.
Their index reflects “the incremental cost to the employer of deviating from a
hypothetical rigid contract, in which the conditions of a job are specified and
a worker cannot be fired”. We will use it to capture the effect of employment
protection empirically. This index is included between 0 and 1. The higher the
index is, the stronger the employment protection.
The four subindexes used to build this aggregate index are the following. The
first one captures the strictness of the protection against alternative employment
contracts, such as part-time labor or temporary contracts. The second index
measures the cost of increasing working hours from 1,758 hours (the level in
Denmark before overtime) per year initially to 2,418 hours per year (Kenya’s
legal maximum per year before overtime). The third subindex captures the cost
of firing workers. It is based on a scenario where a firm with 250 employees
wants to fire 50 of them (25 for redundancy and 25 without cause). The cost
of firing includes paying the sum of the notice period, the severance payment
and any other mandatory penalty. The fourth subindex is the “restrictions on
employers for firing workers”. It includes notifications, approvals, mandatory
relocation or restraining and priority rules for reemployment.
Measuring employment protection is a difficult task (see Bertola et al. (2000)
for an overview of the main methodological challenges). Two main other fami-
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lies of indexes could have been chosen to approximate the level of employment
protection: the Doing Business indexes built by the World Bank or the OECD
EPL indexes. The latter have a temporal dimension and take into account 18
dimensions related to employment protection. Unfortunately, these indexes are
only available for OECD countries. Therefore, using them is not relevant for
our study which focuses on global migration trends and not only on migra-
tion between OECD countries. The former are available for a larger number
of countries, but the scope of the indexes is narrow. Two indexes are specif-
ically related to employment protection, as defined by Pissarides (2001): the
difficulty of hiring index and the difficulty of firing index. The former focuses
only on part-time and fixed-term contracts. On the contrary, the latter includes
information related to the employment insurance, which is outside the scope of
our study. The goal of Doing Business indexes is to capture a general level of
“rigidity of employment”, which is not exactly the same thing as employment
protection, per se. For all these reasons, we use the index proposed by Botero
et al. (2004).2
Graph 1 shows the relation between the level of employment protection,
proxied by the aggregated index built by Botero et al. (2004) for the year 2000,
and the GDP per capita. It shows a strong heterogeneity of employment protec-
tion laws and a low correlation with the income level. The level of employment
protection can be very high in very poor countries such as Mozambique (0.79)
or Tanzania (0.69) , but also in rich countries (0.74 in France, Spain or Swe-
den). The highest levels are observed in Russia (0.82) and Tunisia (0.81). On
the contrary, the lowest levels are observed in Zambia (0.14) and New Zealand
(0.12). Table 1 shows the average level by region and income level. The average
level of EPL is almost identical in high income OECD countries and low income
countries. Europe and Central Asia are the regions with the highest level of em-
ployment protection , while North America and Asia are the regions with the
lowest level. If the correlation with income is low, the legal tradition (civil or
common law) is a strong determinant of employment protection (Botero et al.,
2004). Globally, it is shown that civil law countries and countries with a so-
cialist tradition have a stronger level of employment protection, all other things
being equal. In a very recent paper, Campos and Nugent (2012) show that
unemployment and trade liberalization appear to be the main determinants of
changes in employment protection legislation.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
2This index has been very recently extended by Campos and Nugent (2012) for the 1960-
2005 period. But as noted by these authors, their index (LAMRIG) has been “designed to be
as consistent as possible with the cross-country comparisons” of Botero et al. (2004). As we
use migration data for 2000, the use of the Botero et al. (2004) index is completely suitable
for our study.
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The International Labour Organization took several initiatives relative to
the reinforcement of workers’ protection. In 1950, the International Labour
Conference adopted a resolution denouncing the lack of international regula-
tion concerning labor contracts. In 1963, a first recommendation was adopted
on the termination of employment. But it was only in 1982 that a convention
was formally adopted (The Termination of Employment Convention, 1982, No.
1958). This convention sets as a fundamental principle the need for a valid
reason connected with the: (a) capacity or (b) conduct of the worker; or (c) the
operational requirements of the undertaking. It forbids certain reasons such as
union membership or maternity leave. Workers must have the right to ques-
tion the justification given if they think that the termination of employment
is unjustified. The convention also requires a reasonable period of notice or
compensation. If these rules can be seen as the basis of universal principles
regarding employment protection, only 36 countries have ratified this conven-
tion. The ILO general survey on the protection against unjustified dismissal
(ILO, 1995) documents the heterogeneity of employment protection regulations
in different countries. Most countries have specific legislative tools. These rules
are included either in the labor code, the labor law, the civil law or in specific
legislation related to employment. The constitution of some countries such as
Brazil also includes such principles. In most countries, collective agreements
complement the legislation. But in some others such as Zambia, employment
protection is solely dealt with in collective agreements. Legislation on fixed-term
contracts is also very diverse. Most countries limit the term of such contracts.
Mali for instance forbids fixed-term contracts exceeding two years. These con-
tracts cannot be renewed more than twice. Even in countries where there is
no limitation on the use of fixed-term contracts, specific rules concerning the
termination of such employment do exist. In average and to a certain degree, al-
most all countries do have formal rules connected with employment protection.
ILO (1995), Betcherman et al. (2001) or ILO (2011) present numerous exam-
ples of specific regulations in various countries, including a large proportion of
developing countries.
One specific concern in developing countries is the effective coverage of such
regulations when the level of informality is high. In an economy where most
individuals are working in informal companies, legal regulations related to em-
ployment protection are not really respected. However, many countries take
this situation into account and have adapted their legislation to recognize these
informal or even “implicit” labor contracts. In countries such as Mali for in-
stance, if the labor contract is not written, it is supposed to be a permanent
work contract. This implies that a “valid reason” should be given to the worker
in case of a termination of employment. If it is not the case, the worker can
go to court, even if there is no written or formal contract. The effectiveness of
such provisions therefore depends on the efficiency of the legal system.
Another dimension is the correlation between employment protection and
informality. A huge literature, starting with Todaro (1969) and Harris and
Todaro (1970), and more recently the insider/outsider theories (Lindbeck and
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Snower, 2001), has shown that regulations which are too tight in the formal sec-
tor may explain the shift of workers from the formal sector to the informal sector.
Besley and Burgess (2004) also showed that “pro-worker regulations” in India
explained a shift from the formal to the informal sector. It was also the view of
the World Bank in 1990 when it stated in the World Development Report that
“labour market policies raise the cost of labour in the formal sector and reduce
labour demand, increase the supply of labour to the rural and urban informal
sectors.” (World Bank 1990 quoted by Freeman 2010). Other papers challenge
such a relation empirically (see Freeman 2010 for an overview). But one can
expect a positive correlation between employment protection and informality.
What are the implications of such a correlation? They are twofold. First, we
should control for the level of informality in our empirical strategy. Second, we
have to keep in mind that a possible channel of transmission from employment
protection to migration may be this link through the level of informality. We
will take these two implications into account.
2.2. The Economic Effects of Employment Protection and the Transmission
Channel with Migration
Employment protection is likely to have a significant effect on (1) the level of
wages, and (2) the level of employment, unemployment and informality. Both
dimensions influence the decision to migrate. By including the effects on wages
and employment, explaining the influence of employment protection on migra-
tion is relatively straightforward. By using a traditional model of migration,
such as the one of Grogger and Hanson (2011)3, we can identify several theo-
retical channels that may explain our empirical results. This model is based on
the maximization of a linear utility function. For each period, individuals will
compare their utility in their home country and their utility in every possible
country of destination if they decide to migrate, taking the cost of migration
into account. Their utility will be a function of three parameters: their wage,
their probability of being unemployed, and the cost of migration if they decide
to migrate. By maximizing their utility, individuals will decide to migrate or
not, and will also decide on the destination. This type of model can explain the
scale of migration empirically, but also the selection of migrants based on their
skill level, as shown by Grogger and Hanson (2011).
2.2.1. The Effect of Employment Protection on Wages
There is no consensus in the literature regarding the final effect of employ-
ment protection on wages. Lazear (1990) predicts that firing costs drive wages
down in a competitive economy with decentralized wage-setting. In this model,
the worker transfers the amount of the severance pay to the firm on signing the
contract4. Pissarides (2001) also suggests a negative effect of employment pro-
tection on wages. In his framework, workers are risk-averse and accept a lower
3Which is itself derived from the seminal model of Roy (1951).
4However, in the empirical part of this paper, he shows that employment protection reduces
employment because of wage rigidities.
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income during productive periods in order to receive a higher income during
unproductive times.
Another field of the literature is based on the insider/outsider theories5.
Saint-Paul (2002) considers that incumbent workers get a rent due to the exis-
tence of match-specific human capital. The rent thus grows with the gap be-
tween the productivity of insiders and outsiders, but also with their bargaining
power. Bertola (1990) considers that the final effect of employment protec-
tion will depend on the wage-setting institutions. When trade unions only care
about their working members, employment protection increases the total labor
income for insiders. These workers benefit from additional bargaining power
in the wage process. In an efficiency wage framework, Guell (2000) shows that
severance payments increase the wages of insiders in equilibrium. Garibaldi
and Violante (2005) argue that workers face a trade-off between their wish for
a higher wage (the income effect) and the probability of getting fired (the job
security effect). Under certain restrictive conditions, if the wage-setting institu-
tion is a monopolistic union and the elasticity of the firm’s firing probability to
wages is low enough, workers will demand higher wages when employment pro-
tection rises. Other authors consider that enhanced employment protection will
increase the incentives for firms to invest in firm-specific human capital (Aru-
lampalam et al., 2004). Nickell and Layard (1999) show that these investments
may pay off in terms of higher productivity and higher wages.
It is difficult to conclude, both from a theoretical and empirical6 perspective
on the final effect of employment protection on wages. It will mainly depend
on the wage-setting institutions and the rigidity of nominal wages. If we adapt
the specification adopted in the Grogger and Hanson (2011) model, the wage in
country h for skill level j can be defined as follows:
wjh = woh + λ
j
hPh + δ
j
hD
j
s (1)
where woh is the wage for an unskilled and unprotected worker in country h
(without the wage effect of employment protection), Ph is the level of employ-
ment protection and λjh is the wage effect of such a protection for a worker
with skill j in destination countries. δjh is the wage premium, i.e. the absolute
wage difference between high-skilled workers and unskilled workers7. Djs = 1
5See Lindbeck and Snower (2001) for an overview.
6An establishment-level study (Blanchflower et al., 1990) and a cross-country study (Holm-
lund and Zetterberg, 1991) suggest insider wage gains. Using a Dutch data set of individuals
of all tenures and backgrounds, van der Wiel (2010) also finds a strong positive effect of em-
ployment protection on wages. Leonardi and Pica (2007) find the opposite effect using Italian
micro-data.
7We should notice here that δ is not the return to education per se , but an absolute
difference between a skilled worker’s wages and an unskilled worker’s wages. We do not focus
here on relative differences of wages and utilities. Grogger and Hanson (2011) show that
migration stocks are driven by absolute wage differences, not relative wage differences. We
will then use a linear utility function instead of a log-linear utility function as in Borjas (1987)
for instance. Concerning wages, Grogger and Hanson (2011) use a log-linear definition of
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stands for workers with skill j, 0 otherwise8. It means that λjh can be negative
if employment protection has a negative effect (as in Lazear, 1990 or Pissarides
, 2001) or positive if employment protection increases the bargaining power of
workers and thus their wages (Saint-Paul, 2002; Bertola, 1990; Guell, 2000).
The wage effect of employment protection may also vary based on the skill
level (λ1h 6= λ2h). This assumption follows empirical results in the literature
showing that the effects are not similar for high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
van der Wiel (2010) finds that an additional month of notice increases the wages
of low-skilled workers by 5.75% against only 2.77% for high-skilled workers.
Similarly, Leonardi and Pica (2007) finds that the introduction of a severance
payment for small firms in Italy explained a decrease of the returns to tenure.
2.2.2. The Effect of Employment Protection on Employment
Two distinct effects can be identified. Employment protection may have an
effect on (1) the aggregate level of employment, but also on (2) the job finding
probability. Concerning the former, there is also a lack of consensus. Bentolila
and Bertola (1990) find a positive impact on long-run average employment. If
firms are much more reluctant to hire due to higher costs, hired workers also
quit much more rarely , leading to a possible positive effect. In a dynamic set-
up, they show that employment protection may reduce labor demand in good
times due to a higher marginal revenue product needed to start hiring, and
may increase it in bad times. Lazear (1990) shows that the effect of employ-
ment protection may be neutral if wages can be adjusted in order to take the
additional cost for the firms into account. The cost is thus born by workers.
Nevertheless, we may observe a decline in employment if wages increase due to
an improved bargaining power for workers (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994)9. On
the contrary, employment may increase if employment protection increases the
level of productivity through better cooperation between workers (Fella, 2004)
or through more training (Belot et al., 2002). The final effects on employment
will then depend on (1) the effect of employment protection on wages, and (2)
the effect on productivity. Empirical results are also not clear-cut. Blanchard
and Portugal (2001) show that the rates of job creation and destruction are
lower in Portugal than in the US due to a higher level of employment protec-
tion. Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004) find a significant lower job creation rate and
a non-significant effect on job destruction.
wages which allows them to introduce the return to education directly. However, they only
use this return to education when they estimate log-linear utility function models. When they
estimate their utility function model, they only focus on absolute wage differences between
skilled and unskilled workers. By defining as such the wage of skilled and unskilled workers,
we make the same choice here. Following our linear utility model, we will then only need
absolute wage differences.
8For simplification purposes, we assume there is no skill deprivation between source and
destination country, so that Djs = D
j
h
= Dj .
9It is also what Lazear (1990) finds empirically.
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The effect on the job finding probability is more likely to be negative. For in-
stance, if Bentolila and Bertola (1990) show that higher firing costs may increase
long-run average employment, they also consider that it leads to a fall in the
attrition rate due the reluctance of firms to hire new workers. The job finding
probability for outsiders should be negative in this case. Vindigni (2008) also
considers that employment protection may reduce job creation, depressing the
exit rate from unemployment to the detriment of the unemployed. As migrants
are mainly newcomers on the labor market and therefore outsiders, the effect
of employment protection on their probability of finding a job is therefore most
likely negative, even if the net effect of employment protection on aggregate
employment is unclear. In the Grogger and Hanson (2011) model, it is possible
to include this probability of finding a job in the utility function of the migrant.
As in Harris and Todaro (1970), what matters for the migrant is the expected
wage, i.e. the wage weighted by the probability of finding a job. If employment
protection has an impact on this probability, it also has an impact on the utility
of the migrant.
In developing countries, unemployment insurance is very weak. The offi-
cial unemployment rate may be very low despite a very high level of under-
employment. Most of what the ILO calls “vulnerable employment”, including
contributing family workers and self-employment, is indeed a form of under-
employment. It means that the “job finding probability” must be understood
in developing countries as a probability of finding a “formal job”, more than a
probability of being employed.
If the literature has largely reviewed the effects of employment protection in
developed countries, few studies have focused specifically on developing coun-
tries. We can quote the study of Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000) that shows
that job security provisions and costs of dismissals are high in Latin America,
and much costlier than in OECD countries. But as shown by Freeman (2010),
the empirical evidence from different countries is mixed. Kugler (2004) find that
the weakening of EPL in Colombia was associated with an employment increase
and a decline in job tenure in the formal sector relative to the informal sector.
Studies on Chile (Edwards and Edwards, 2000; Montenegro and Pages, 2004;
Petrin and Sivadasan, 2006) find no effects on aggregate employment. In India,
Besley and Burgess (2004) show that changes in regulations towards more em-
ployment protection lead to a shift in employment and output from the formal
to the informal sector.10
2.2.3. The Effect of Employment Protection on Migration
The final effect of employment protection on migration will therefore depend
on three parameters: (1) the effect on employment, (2) the effect on wages and
10Bhattacharjea (2006) criticizes the index of “pro-worker regulations” built by Besley and
Burgess (2004). However, Ahsan and Pages (2009) report that the results are robust to
Bhattacharjea’s amended measure.
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(3) the relative preference for employment and wages. As there is no consensus
in the theoretical literature on the effect of employment protection on these
parameters, it is mainly an empirical issue. We will therefore adapt the utility
function proposed by Grogger and Hanson (2011) in order to include the poten-
tial effect of employment protection.
The utility of migrating from source country s to destination country h
is a linear function of the difference between wage wjh on the one hand and,
migration cost Cjsh and probability of being unemployed Prob(u)h on the other
hand, as well as an unobserved idiosyncratic term ǫsh. We also control for the
unobserved characteristics of country h that may affect the utility of the migrant
by introducing Ah
11 into the utility function. The utility function is therefore
given by the following equation:
U jsh = αw
j
h − βCjsh − χProb(u)h +Ah + ǫsh (2)
Considering that employment protection may have an impact on the proba-
bility of being unemployed, we can rewrite Prob(u)h = δ+ γ
j .Ph with δ ∈ [0, 1]
an exogenous rate of unemployment and γj the influence of employment protec-
tion on the level of unemployment. The utility function will therefore be equal
to:
U jsh = αw
j
h − βCjsh − χδ − χγj .Ph +Ah + ǫsh (3)
If labor markets are fully flexible and the effect on wages is strictly the
opposite of the effect on employment, the net effect of employment protection
on the level of utility will only depend on parameters α and χ. If χ > α,
job security is considered more important than the wage effect. It may be
interpreted in some ways as a parameter of risk aversion.
We assume that workers choose whether or not to migrate so as to maximize
their utility. We also assume that ǫsh follows an i.i.d. extreme value distribution.
Following Grogger and Hanson (2011), we can apply the result of McFadden
(1974) to write the log odds of migration to destination country versus staying
in the source country as12 :
ln
N jsh
N jss
= α[(woh − wos) + (δjh − δjs)]− βCjsh + (αλj − χγj)(Ph − Ps) + (Ah −As)
(5)
11Mayda (2010) and Grogger and Hanson (2011) show that by not controlling for unobserved
migration costs in the scale regression, the impact of earning on migration is underestimated.
The lack of fixed effects may thus explain the unstable relationship between income and
migration in the literature.
12Alternatively, we can consider that this exogenous rate of unemployment is specific to
11
where Nsh is the population share born in s that migrates to h and Nss is the
population share born in s that remains in s. The probability of migrating will
then depend on three main parameters: the difference of wages, the difference
of employment protection and the migration cost. Differences of wages should
influence migration positively (α > 0). The migration cost may influence the
probability of migrating negatively. And the effect of employment protection is
undefined, depending on the sign of parameter (αλj−χγj). Here , the variables
measuring the migration cost will be the same for different skills, whereas the
effect of each variable may differ based on the skill of the migrant. This equation
will be used to estimate the scale of migration.
3. Data, Empirical Specification and Econometric Strategy
3.1. Empirical Specification
As previously mentioned, the initial model is the following:
ln
N jsh
N jss
= α[(woh − wos) + (δjh − δjs)]− βCjsh + (αλj − χγj)(Ph − Ps) + (Ah −As)
(6)
However, Nss is the native population of country s living in country s. This
variable could be defined as the total population living in the country minus
the total number of immigrants (defined as the population born abroad). The
problem is that, for most developing countries, we only know the number of
emigrants , but not the number of immigrants. Nss is therefore unobserved.
Following Beine et al. (2011), we transform our initial model as follows:
lnN jsh = α[(woh − wos) + (δjh − δjs)]− βCjsh + (αλj − χγj)(Ph − Ps) +Ah +As
(7)
In this specification, Nss is captured by origin fixed effects (As). The de-
pendent variable is therefore the migration flows between source country s and
each country, i.e. have δh instead of δ. If δh 6= δs, we have:
ln
N
j
sh
N
j
ss
= α[(woh − wos) + (δ
j
h
− δjs)]− β(fsh + g
j
sh
) + (αλj − χγj)(Ph − Ps)− χ(δh − δs) + (Ah −As)
(4)
However, it is very difficult to assess the difference of unemployment for a large number
of countries empirically. The comparability of unemployment data is low. And in most
developing countries, informal work is a substitute for unemployment. The official level of
unemployment thus does not describe the real level of under-employment. The alternative
would be to consider only the unemployment level in destination countries which are mainly
OECD countries where unemployment data are homogenized. However, if unemployment data
are not available or not relevant in source countries, the unemployment level in destination
countries would be empirically captured by fixed effect Ah.
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host country d. The subscript j refers to the level of education (high-skilled or
low-skilled).
3.2. Data
Migration flow data13 are from the International Migration Statistics (IMS)
database (OECD, 2010). These data are provided by the Continuous Reporting
System on Migration (SOPEMI) which encompasses most OECD countries,
Baltic States and Bulgaria and Romania as host immigration countries. This
data set provides migrant flows (inflows and outflows) and is based either on
population registers, residence permit data or in a few cases on specific surveys.
In this paper, we focus on the determinants of inflows, i.e. the migration from
76 possible countries of origin to 27 countries of destination (see the country
sample in annex).14 We keep the data from 2000 onwards, to avoid a problem
of reverse causality with employment protection (the EPL index is built for that
year).
Concerning the migration by skill level, we use the database built by Doc-
quier and Marfouk (2004) which provides bilateral migration stocks of skilled
and unskilled workers for 192 source countries , migrating to 30 OECD destina-
tion countries15 for the years 1990 and 2000. This database covers 92.7 percent
of the OECD immigration stock. We use the difference in stock between 2000
and 1990 to approximate the flow of migration, as in Beine et al. (2011).16
Employment protection is measured using the index of Botero et al. (2004),
described in the previous section. The higher the index, the stronger the employ-
ment protection. More precisely, we use the employment protection differential,
built as the difference between the level of employment protection in the country
of destination and that of origin. Therefore, a small value for the employment
protection differential reflects a relative ”proximity” in labor market regulations,
while a higher value captures a ”social distance” between the two countries.
Concerning wage data, it is very difficult to find relevant data for a large
sample of countries including many developing countries. Different databases
exist (like the Luxembourg Income Study or the ILO wage database). However
the number of countries is too limited for our sample, especially for developing
13See Annex A for a detailed description of the variables and the sources and Annex B for
a correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of all variables.
14The migration database includes 154 countries of origin and 30 countries of destination.
However, we are limited by the coverage of the Botero et al. (2004) index which covers 85
countries.
15As for the previous database, we are restricted by the use of the employment protection
index. Our sample also includes 74 countries of origin and 27 countries of destination .
16As noticed by Beine et al. (2011), the proxy is not perfect as it is affected by deaths and
return migration in 1990 , but “it is accurate enough to derive a reasonable approximation”.
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countries17. We then use the GDP per capita as a proxy of individual income. It
is nevertheless impossible to distinguish a wage for skilled and unskilled workers
within the same country.
In order to do so, we use a methodology proposed by Grogger and Hanson
(2011) for the estimations by skill level. They reconstruct an estimate of income
for the 20th and 80th percentiles in the country by using the GDP per capita
and GINI coefficient. The GDP per capita for the 20th percentile will then
be considered as a proxy for the unskilled wage , while the GDP per capita
for the 80th percentile will be considered as a proxy for the skilled wage. If
we assume that income has a log-normal distribution, GINI coefficients can be
used to estimate the variance of log income (see Annex C for details on how
this is calculated ). The GDP per capita is taken from the World Development
Indicators database , while GINI coefficients come from WIDER.
We also control for the relative level of the informal sector. According to the
insider/outsider theories, employment protection may push some workers out of
the formal labor market. In this case, these new “outsiders” can be unemployed
or work in the informal economy where employment protection legislation is
not applied. If this is the case, we should observe a strong positive correlation
between the size of informality, unemployment and the level of employment
protection that may bias our results. However, in most developing countries, the
unemployment rate is not really relevant because of the lack of unemployment
benefits: workers have no other choice than to find an informal job. This is
why we propose to add the differential of informality instead of the differential
of unemployment rate. As a proxy, we use the level of informality measured by
Schneider et al. (2010).
In both cases, the stock of immigrants in 1990 (Docquier and Marfouk, 2004)
is used as an explanatory variable to approximate the size of the diaspora18 As
shown in Beine et al. (2011), the diaspora effect plays a key role in explaining
migration flows, and can also be included in the cost function of migration. The
diaspora tends to reduce this cost.
The cost of migration is also approximated by several bilateral variables: (1)
sharing a border (contiguity), (2) sharing a language (commonlanguage), (3)
having a former colonial relationship (colony), and the distance in kilometers
between the two countries19. The cost of migration should be lower for coun-
tries which are culturally and historically close, whereas a greater geographical
17The alternative would be to use only wage data for destination countries , which are
mainly developed countries where this information is available. However, as we include origin
and destination fixed effects in our estimates, this variable will be dropped in the estimation.
18The diaspora level (expressed in millions) is divided by 10,000 in order to get comparable
estimated coefficients.
19For all these variables, see Mayer and Signago (2006) for details. As for the diaspora
variable, we divided the distance by 10,000 in order to estimate coefficients with a comparable
magnitude
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distance should increase the cost of migration. We also add a bilateral variable
which takes the value of 1 if the two countries are in the Schengen free mobility
area.
As explained previously, all other country characteristics specific to the coun-
try of origin or of destination will be captured by the inclusion of fixed effects
(As and Ad) in our estimations.
3.3. Econometric Strategy
All estimations firstly use robust OLS estimators , and standard errors are
clustered at the origin-destination-couple level. However, we should take differ-
ent econometric problems into account: (1) the potential selection bias due to
the high occurrence of zeros or missing values for the dependent variable, and
(2) a possible endogeneity bias. We will briefly discuss these potential problems
and propose methodologies to correct them.
3.3.1. Zero Flows and Missing Values
One important feature in our migration database is the potential selection
bias either due to the high presence of missing observations (42% in our sample
based on flows), or to the high presence of zero flows (20% of our sample based
on stocks), or both.
In the IMS flows database, the proportion of zeros is relatively low (3.17% in
2000) , but the proportion of missing values is relatively high (42% in 2000). As
noticed by Mayda (2010), “the sum by country of origin of the IMS numbers is
not equal to 100% of the total flow into each destination country.” In Belgium,
for instance, the immigrant inflow covered by the disaggregate data represents
only 45% of total flows. Then, these missing values may represent small flows
, particularly for small countries where migration is low. Not considering the
missing observations in our analysis could lead to a bias of selection.
We then decide to keep these observations and to estimate our model using a
Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML). This method is consistent when
there is a high proportion of zeros and problems of heteroskedasticity (Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006).20
20As a robustness check, we also estimate a Heckman two-step selection model as in Beine
et al. (2011). We use the diplomatic exchange as an exclusion variable. The results remain
mostly similar to our results and can be obtained upon request. The main problem of this
strategy is the sensitivity of the parameter estimates to different exclusion variables (Greene
2005, p.789). Also, the PPML method is more accurate to deal with problems of heteroskedas-
ticity. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that it is more likely to be a problem when estimating
gravity equations. This is why we prefer using the PPML method.
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3.4. Endogeneity Bias
Endogeneity may be an issue if (1) there are omitted variables that are
correlated with our variable of interest, and if (2) there is a reverse causality in
the event that migration affects employment protection.
In our case, the inclusion of fixed effects in the country of origin and of desti-
nation reduces the potential bias of the omitted variable. One possible omitted
variable could be immigration policy, which may be linked to the stringency of
labor market regulations. The interaction between a restrictive migration pol-
icy and the generosity of the welfare state (through its social or fiscal policies)
has been widely studied (Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999; Lee and Miller, 2000;
Storesletten, 2000; Razin et al., 2009). Here, there are two differences. First, we
focus on labor market institutions and not on social expenditures as it is done in
the literature on welfare migration. Second, migration policy is mainly unilat-
eral. Bilateral agreements are very limited (except for the Schengen area, which
we control for) , or do not change the scale of the unilateral migration policy
of the host country. As we estimate the impact of the employment protection
differential, we can include origin and destination fixed effects. Following Beine
et al. (2011), the effect of migration policy is therefore captured by destination
fixed effects. This choice is made also taking into account the lack of consensus
in the literature on the appropriate way of measuring such migration policies.
Indeed, another possible omitted variable is the generosity of the welfare state.
We acknowledge that social expenditures in destination countries may be a sig-
nificant determinant of migration. However, the effects of social characteristics
in destination countries are captured through destination fixed effects. Con-
trary to employment protection, the differential of social expenditures between
the country of origin and of destination is of little interest. What may matter
for the migrants is the level of social services provided by the State, and not
the general level of social expenditures per se. As these expenditures are very
heterogeneous from one country to another, the level of social services provided
by $1 of social expenditures cannot really be compared internationally.
The other potential econometric problem is reverse causality. In our case,
it could mean that bilateral migration flows have an impact on employment
protection legislation. By using migration flow data after 2000, we exclude this
possibility. Also, we use a bilateral database. The probability that migration
from one specific country to another affects the legislation is therefore limited,
at least in the short run.
Even if we show that this endogeneity bias is more likely to be very limited
in our case, we cannot completely exclude this possibility because of the inher-
ent risk of remaining omitted variables that may be correlated with the level of
employment protection. We therefore propose to use a two-stage least-square
(2SLS) method with instrumental variables to check the consistency of our re-
sults. Such instrumental variables should be exogenous and not correlated with
the error term (the condition of orthogonality). In other words, these variables
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should be correlated with employment protection (the condition of relevance)
, but should not have any direct impact on migration. We use the literature
on the determinants of employment protection to find such instruments. One
potential candidate is the legal system of a country (common law versus civil
law). However, it appears that migration can also be explained by historic legal
systems (Cohen et al., 2009). It cannot be considered as a valid instrument.
Botero et al. (2004) consider that labor regulation can be seen as a result
of a game between employers and employees, depending on their relative bar-
gaining power. Stringent employment protection is more likely to be adopted
where the bargaining power of workers is strong. This linkage is common in the
literature on labor market institutions. Saint-Paul (2002) for instance shows
the complementarity between employment protection and other labor market
policies which are essentially explained by the bargaining power of workers. The
political power of unions is thus a strong determinant of employment protec-
tion. Saint-Paul (1996) shows that a lot of labor market reforms failed due to a
broad mobilization of “insiders”, represented by some trade unions. One crucial
aspect is not only the bargaining power of workers within firms , but the ability
of unions to influence governmental decisions.
This is why we propose to use the indexes proposed by Botero et al. (2004)
to measure the legal protection of workers. More specifically, we propose to use
the right to unionize and to strike as instrument variables. The first instrument
is therefore a political strike dummy variable, defined as the legal right to go
on strike because of governmental decisions. The second instrument captures
whether the law allows to go on strike to express solidarity with another union
or worker , even if there is no grievance against one’s own employer. Third, the
additional instrument we propose to use is the protection of the right to form
a trade union. This variable is equal to one if this right is expressly granted by
the constitution and zero otherwise. In our view, the right to unionize and the
right to strike could indicate a stronger political power of unions , and could
affect governmental decisions in particular concerning labor market institutions
and employment protection laws. It is however very difficult to see how these
variables could be correlated with the probability of migrating. This is why
we consider these variables are possible valid and relevant instruments. Our
endogenous variable is the employment protection differential , so we also use
the differential of our variables between the country of destination and of origin
as an instrument. Because our instruments are dummy variables, the differential
can be either equal to -1 or 0 or 1.
Obviously, the collinearity between instrumental variables and some country
fixed effects is very strong and leads to estimations that could be biased. So,
we have decided to use 2SLS estimations without country fixed effects. The
possibility of an omitted variable bias is limited by the use of instrumental vari-
ables. We also add an additional list of control variables, reflecting the country
characteristics that are considered to be the main determinants of international
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migration (Hatton and Williamson, 2006, 2008).21
We report two tests showing the relevance and validity of our set of instru-
ments. The F-statistic of the first stage checks the relevance of our instruments,
i.e. the capacity to explain our endogenous variable (here, employment protec-
tion). We generally consider that an F-statistic higher than 10 is an acceptable
condition of relevance. The Hansen over-identification test aims at checking the
condition of orthogonality. To consider our set of instruments valid, we should
reject the null hypothesis. We report the p-value associated with this test.22
4. Empirical Results
First, we will present the results estimating the determinants of migration
flows using the IMS data set. Then, we will present the results concerning
the migration of low-skilled and high-skilled workers using the Docquier and
Marfouk (2004) data set.
4.1. Influence of the Employment Protection Differential on Migration Inflows
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The main results concerning the estimates of the scale of migration (equa-
tion 7) are given by Table 2. The first column reports OLS robust estimators
with standard errors clustered at the origin-destination-couple level. The sec-
ond column presents the Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) regres-
sion model, and the last column, the results using the Two-Stage Least-Square
(2SLS) method.
We show that the differential of employment protection is a strong deter-
minant of migration. We find that the higher this differential, the lower the
migration flow. The estimated coefficient is negative and strongly significant
(at the 1% significance level). A large gap between employment protection in
the source and the destination country may be seen as a ”social distance” that
will increase the migration cost. Based on the model, three interpretations can
be made: (1) the effect of labor protection on wages is negative, inducing a
21The control variables are the following: the population in the country of origin and of
destination, the percentage of people between 15 and 24 years old in the countries of origin
(WPP 2008), the percentage of secondary school attained (Barro and Lee, 2000), the index of
democracy (POLITY IV), immigration policy measured as the government’s view , and the
share of refugees in the total number of migrants (United Nations, 2002; Beine et al., 2011).
See the Annex for a detailed description of these variables .
22We use secondary strikes and unionization as instrumental variables for the estimates with
the IMS data. We use political strikes and unionization for the estimates with the Docquier
and Marfouk (2004) data (see the definition of instruments in Annex A). We chose this to
ensure the respect of both the condition of orthogonality and the condition of relevance.
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negative parameter λjh, (2) the effect of labor protection on the risk of unem-
ployment is more negative than the effect on the wage (|γj | > |λj | with λj < 0),
or (3) χ > α which may be interpreted as a preference for job security over wage
premium. Migrants do not seem to look for more protective labor legislations
if they lead to a too great “social distance” between their country of origin and
the country of destination, as it may negatively affect their capacity to integrate
the labor market.
The estimated coefficients are relatively similar when using PPML and OLS
(-3.264 in OLS against -3.520 in PPML). The third estimate using the TSLS
method confirms the consistency of this result. The magnitude of the coefficient
is however lower when controlling for endogeneity , but remains negative and
strongly significant. Overall, the estimated coefficient is included between -1.1
and -3.5. To give a quantitative assessment of this result, let us take the case
of the migration from Egypt to France. The EPL index takes the value of 0.37
for Egypt and 0.74 for France. If we want to observe the effect of a one stan-
dard deviation fall in the employment protection differential, it can come from
an increase in employment protection in Egypt or a decrease in employment
protection in France. The standard deviation of the employment protection dif-
ferential is 0.27. This theoretical situation may approximatively reflect the fact
that Egypt has increased its level of employment protection, closer to a level like
that of Poland, Mali or Panama. Another possibility is that this change comes
from a decrease in employment protection in France, which could indicate that
the average level in this country has become closer to that of Austria or South
Korea. This decrease in the employment protection differential will therefore
be associated with an increase in migration flows, estimated between 26% and
63% depending on the method of estimation.23
The differential of the informal labor market size is positively and signifi-
cantly associated with the level of migration flows. As this differential is nega-
tive on average (informality is lower in destination countries than in countries
of origin ), it means that migrants are attracted by countries with a level of
informality close to that of their country of origin. It can be interpreted as a
proxy of the capacity for migrants to integrate the labor market of their desti-
nation country. The differential of GDP also takes the expected sign. However,
we should note that these effects are no longer significant when using the PPML
method.
As found in Beine et al. (2011), the lagged diaspora explains the international
migration inflows positively and significantly. This means that the size of the
diaspora should decrease the cost of migration and therefore reinforce the scale
23The calculations are based on the following formula: (eβ.σ − 1) ∗ 100. There were 758
migrants from Egypt to France on a yearly basis. It could mean that a one standard devia-
tion fall in the employment protection differential can explain an increase in the number of
migrants, for a total included between 955 and 1,213 depending on the method of estimation.
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of migration.
Geographical and cultural proximity plays a key role in the migration pro-
cess. Distance is found to have a negative impact on migration , while sharing
a border, a language and a colonial history has a positive impact on migration.
4.2. Influence of the Employment Protection Differential on Migration Selection
After explaining the scale of migration, we want to see if these effects can be
distinguished between low-skilled and high-skilled migrants. Table 3 presents
our results. The determinants of high-skilled migration are presented in columns
1-3 and those of low-skilled migration in columns 4-6. For each skill level, the
same structure is adopted with OLS (Columns 1 and 4), PPML (Columns 2 and
5) and then 2SLS estimations (Columns 3 and 6). We should take into account
the fact that we had to use another migration database for this set of estima-
tions. Thus, the magnitude of the coefficients cannot be compared directly with
the previous one. Also, contrary to the previous set of estimates, flows are ap-
proximated by the difference of stocks between 1990 and 2000. The time span
is therefore slightly different and we cannot control for return migration. The
results should therefore be interpreted cautiously.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
We find a strong difference of impact between high-skilled and low-skilled
migrants. For the former, we still find a negative and strongly significant coef-
ficient, confirming our previous results. The results are much more striking for
low-skilled migrants. We even find a positive impact of the employment protec-
tion differential on migration when using the OLS and PPML methods. One
should however be very cautious in the interpretation of this last result. We
find a negative and significant coefficient when using the TSLS method, even
if the magnitude of the coefficient is much lower than for high-skilled workers.
The possible influence of other social characteristics, correlated with the level of
EPL may explain the difference of results between the TSLS, PPML and OLS
methods.
What can be learnt from this last set of estimates? First, the negative impact
of employment protection is no longer robust for low-skilled workers. Second,
whatever the method of estimation chosen, we find a much stronger effect for
high-skilled workers. This result supports the one presented by Cohen et al.
(2009) for social protection.
The results for the differential of GDP or informality are much less robust.
The negative sign for the GDP per capita can be explained by the existence of
a fixed cost of migration which cannot be paid if the differential of income is
too high. The level of informality also seems to be very different for low-skilled
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and high-skilled workers. Further investigation, which goes beyond the scope of
this paper, would be needed to fully explain such a result.
Concerning the diaspora, our result supports the finding of Beine et al. (2011)
that showed a stronger effect for low-skilled migrants than for high-skilled ones.
Geographical and cultural factors also have a distinct impact depending on
the skill level. For high-skilled workers, we found that a common language
was the most important factor, while low-skilled migration is more impacted by
colonial history and distance. The Schengen agreement also seems to have more
impact on high-skilled migration.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how employment protection may affect a mi-
grant’s decision. We have considered two possible transmission channels, exhib-
ited by the literature, the first through the wage level and the second through
the probability of being employed.
The main result is that migrants are not looking for more protective la-
bor legislation. The employment protection differential acts as a repellent for
migrants. We have found that this negative effect is stronger for high-skilled
workers. The key aspect related to the labor market which explains the des-
tination choice of migrants is their capacity to integrate the labor market in
their destination country. If the ”social distance” is too high, their position on
the labor market is more likely to be an outsider position and their probability
of getting a job is lower. This is why they may choose countries where labor
market regulations are not too far from those in their country of origin.
By looking at migration flows, we are able to focus on the specific situation
of newcomers on the labor market of their destination country. As they are
more likely to be outsiders in these markets, we can test the hypothesis that
migrants, whose goal is to maximize their job finding probability, are less likely
to migrate to countries with a more protected labor market. Our estimations
confirm this assumption.
One important question which is left for future research is the influence of
employment protection on return migration. It would be interesting to see how
immigrants who have managed to integrate the local labor market react to em-
ployment protection. In other words, employment protection may also be a
factor retaining immigrants in a given country. We have made exploratory esti-
mates to estimate the influence of employment protection on migration outflows,
using the same OECD data, and have found a negative correlation. We do not
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present the results of these estimates here due to problems with the data24, but
this suggests that it is an important issue for researchers.
The main implication of our paper is the link between immigration policies
and employment protection. If the goal of immigration policies is to attract
relatively more educated workers, a stricter employment protection on the labor
market in itself does not seem to be the right tool. Employment protection
should be compensated for by more open immigration policies. This linkage
can also be seen differently. Migrants are often said to be looking for protective
legislation and generous welfare systems. Here, employment protection tends to
act as a repellent more than as an attractive force.
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Appendix
A. Source and Description of the Variables
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
B. Correlation Matrix
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
C. Wage Data
We use the GDP per capita fromWDI and the Gini coefficient fromWIDER.
This methodology is proposed by Grogger and Hanson (2011) to reconstruct
estimates of high-skilled workers’ and low-skilled workers’ wages. The first step
is to transform the Gini coefficient into the standard deviation of log income. If
income X is lognormally distributed, we have: lnX ∼ N(µ, σ2).
If G is the Gini coefficient, we have σ =
√
2φ−1(G+12 ), where φ
−1 is the
inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function (Bendel et al.,
1989).
Quantiles of income xα such that P (X < xα) = α are given by:
xα = exp(µ+ zασ) (8)
zα is the α quantile of a unit normal random variable Johnson and Kotz
(1970). Since under lognormality, E(X) = exp(µ + σ2/2) we can rewrite the
previous equation as follows:
xα = E(X) exp(σzα − σ2/2) (9)
We use the GDP per capita to estimate E(X) and the Gini coefficient to
estimate σ according to the previous formula.
D. Summary of Statistics
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
E. Countries of Origin
Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Belgium Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Burk-
ina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Croatia Denmark Dominican Republic
Ecuador Egypt Finland France Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Hungary India
Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya Korea, Rep. Lithua-
nia Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Mexico Mongolia Morocco Mozambique
Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Panama Peru Philippines
Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Senegal Singapore Slovak Re-
public South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland Tanzania Thailand
Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom Uruguay Venezuela, RB Viet-
nam Zambia Zimbabwe
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F. Destination Countries
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
Hungary Ireland Italy Japan Korea, Rep. Mexico Netherlands New Zealand
Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey
United Kingdom United States
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Figure 1: EPL and GDP per capita
EPL (Botero et al. 2004), GDP per capita (World Development Indicators)
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Table 1: EPL by region and income
Region Numb. countries Mean St. Er. Min Max
Asia & Pacific 15 0.38 0.14 0.16 0.68
Europe & Central Asia 32 0.61 0.15 0.28 0.83
Latin America & Caribbean 13 0.45 0.15 0.16 0.65
Middle East & North Africa 5 0.49 0.25 0.26 0.82
North America 2 0.24 0.03 0.22 0.26
Sub-Saharan Africa 14 0.41 0.20 0.15 0.80
Income Numb. countries Mean St. Er. Min Max
High income: OECD 28 0.52 0.20 0.16 0.81
High income: Non-OECD 2 0.40 0.12 0.31 0.49
Upper middle income 24 0.49 0.19 0.16 0.83
Lower middle income 17 0.44 0.18 0.15 0.77
Low income 10 0.50 0.21 0.18 0.79
Source: Botero et al. 2004
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Table 2: Determinants of Migration Inflows on Average Between 2000 and 2008
OLS PPML 2SLS
Average Inflows Average Inflows Average Inflows
2000-2008 2000-2008 2000-2008
EPL (differential) -3.264*** -3.520*** -1.092***
(0.611) (0.822) (0.419)
Informality (differential) 0.0561*** -0.118 0.0266***
(0.00805) (0.121) (0.00619)
GDP (differential) 0.0376*** -0.0660 0.0785***
(0.0106) (0.0954) (0.00869)
diaspora 1990 0.00995*** 0.0118*** 0.0210***
(0.00282) (0.00186) (0.00591)
contiguity 0.436** 0.705*** 0.162
(0.214) (0.206) (0.287)
common language 1.346*** 1.221*** 1.038***
(0.134) (0.165) (0.176)
colony 1.171*** 0.543*** 1.696***
(0.192) (0.171) (0.257)
distance -1.551*** -1.423*** -1.139***
(0.155) (0.208) (0.130)
Schengen -0.0235 -0.162 0.412**
(0.143) (0.206) (0.193)
Constant 6.548*** 3.536 6.416***
(0.301) (3.073) (0.593)
Origin fixed effects YES YES NO
Destination fixed effects YES YES NO
Control variables NO NO YES
Observations 1487 1900 1091
R-squared 0.810 0.756 0.451
F test 151.1***
Hansen Test 0.4422
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
In Column 3, the endogenous variable is EPL(differential) and the instruments are the
differential of secondary strikes and unionization (see the definition of the variables in
Annex A). Control variables: population in countries of origin and destination, percentage of
people between 15-24 years old in countries of origin (WPP 2008), percentage of secondary
school attained (Barro and Lee, 2000), index of democracy (POLITY IV), immigration pol-
icy and share of refugees in total number of migrants (United Nations, 2002; Beine et al., 2011)
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Table 3: Determinants of Migration by Educational Level: High- vs Low-Skilled Migrants
High High High Low Low Low
OLS PPML 2SLS OLS PPML 2SLS
EPL (diffential) -2.340*** -5.970*** -3.029*** 4.239** 4.474* -1.827***
(0.545) (1.601) (0.463) (1.643) (2.508) (0.629)
Informality (differential) 0.0400*** -0.746* 0.0167*** -0.0181 -2.093*** 0.00508
(0.00739) (0.422) (0.00638) (0.0176) (0.625) (0.00775)
GDP 80% (differential) -0.0413*** -0.388 0.0499***
(0.00939) (0.249) (0.00734)
GDP 20% (differential) -0.145*** -4.229*** 0.0224
(0.0342) (1.300) (0.0244)
diaspora 1990 0.0118*** 0.0156*** 0.0267*** 0.0283*** 0.0245*** 0.0331***
(0.00367) (0.00479) (0.00893) (0.00539) (0.00547) (0.0118)
contiguity 0.697*** 0.516 0.00915 1.226*** 1.791*** 0.536
(0.262) (0.314) (0.382) (0.371) (0.386) (0.633)
common language 1.284*** 1.141*** 2.031*** 0.759*** 0.845*** 0.385
(0.132) (0.172) (0.179) (0.214) (0.315) (0.284)
colony 1.093*** 0.482** 1.298*** 1.920*** 0.774 2.514***
(0.243) (0.230) (0.276) (0.469) (0.505) (0.652)
distance -1.297*** -0.658** -0.734*** -1.390*** -1.741*** -1.253***
(0.126) (0.266) (0.150) (0.233) (0.400) (0.221)
Schengen 0.679*** 0.947*** -0.124 -0.0613 0.192 -0.628
(0.184) (0.287) (0.248) (0.357) (0.808) (0.388)
Constant 6.791*** 10.41*** 4.844*** 5.047*** -45.26*** 4.302***
(0.403) (0.534) (0.692) (0.492) (14.64) (0.948)
Origin fixed effects YES YES NO YES YES NO
Destination fixed effects YES YES NO YES YES NO
Control Variables NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 1314 1601 977 917 1239 644
R-squared 0.814 0.911 0.440 0.719 0.987 0.342
F-test 170.31*** 114.88***
Hansen Test 0.5828 0.2894
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
In columns 3 and 6, the endogenous variable is EPL (differential). The instruments are
the differential of political strike and unionization (see the definition of the variables in
Annex A). Control variables: population in countries of origin and destination, percentage of
people between 15-24 years old in countries of origin (WPP 2008), percentage of secondary
school attained (Barro and Lee, 2000), index of democracy (POLITY IV), immigration pol-
icy and share of refugees in total number of migrants (United Nations, 2002; Beine et al., 2011)
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Table 4: Description of variables
Variable Description Source
Dependent variables
Average Inflows 2000-2008 Average inflows of migration over the 9 years (2000-2008) in log OECD (2010)
High skilled migration Difference in high-skilled migration stock between 2000 and 1990 (in log) Docquier and Marfouk (2004)
Low skilled migration Difference in low-skilled migration stock between 2000 and 1990 (in log) Docquier and Marfouk (2004)
Explanatory variables
EPL (differential) Differential of measures of the protection of labour and employment laws between source and destination countries Botero et al. (2004)
as the average of: (1) Alternative employment contracts;
(2) Cost of increasing hours worked;
(3) Cost of firing workers; and (4) Dismissal procedures.
Informality (differential) Differential of size of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP. between source and destination countries Schneider et al. (2010)
GDP (differential) Differential of GDP per-capita in PPP divided by 1000 between source and destination countries World Development Indicators 2006
Gini GINI WIDER
GDP 20% (diff.) Differential of wage for low-skilled divided by 1000 between source and destination countries Authors computations
GDP 80% (diff.) Differential of wage for high skilled divided by 1000 between source and destination countries Authors computations
Diaspora 1990 Bilateral migration stock in 1990 divided by 10000 Docquier and Marfouk (2004)
Contiguity dummy equal to 1 if common border CEPII
Common language dummy equal to 1 if same language CEPII
Colony dummy equal to 1 if former colonial link CEPII
Distance simple distance (most populated cities, in km) divided by 10000 CEPII
Schengen 1 if Shengen agreement European Commmission
Control variables
Pop Population divided by 100000000 for origin and destination countries World Development Indicators 2006
Pop15-24 Percentage of 15-24 years old in the total population for origin countries World Population Prospect 2008 rev.
Education Percentage of “secondary school attained” in the total population for origin countries Barro and Lee (1996, 2000)
Polity Agregate index of democracy for origin countries Polity IV project
Immigration policy 1 if the goal of the hosting gouvernment is to lower migration United Nations (2002)
0 if the goal is to maintain or no intervention
Asylee share Share of refugees in the total number of migrants in 2000 in destination countries Beine et al. (2011)
Instruments
Political strike Differential of possibility to be in strike for political reason between source and destination countries Botero et al. (2004)
Secondary strike Differential of possibility to be in strike for solidarity between unions or worker between source and destination countries Botero et al. (2004)
Unionization Differential of possibility to unionize between source and destination countries Botero et al. (2004)
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Table 5: Cross-correlation table
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
1. ln(Inflows Mig) 1.000
2. ln(High Mig) 0.846 1.000
(0.000)
3. ln(Low Mig) 0.798 0.832 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
4. diaspora 1990 0.264 0.301 0.248 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
5. EPL (diff.) -0.124 -0.175 -0.099 -0.099 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
6. Informality (diff.) 0.148 0.095 0.091 0.019 0.099 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.398) (0.000)
7. GDP (diff.) -0.114 -0.068 -0.062 -0.027 -0.001 -0.692 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.077) (0.972) (0.000)
8. GDP 80% (diff.) -0.123 -0.051 -0.058 -0.023 -0.035 -0.696 0.999 1.000
(0.000) (0.021) (0.024) (0.219) (0.138) (0.000) (0.000)
9. GDP 20% (diff.) -0.196 -0.199 -0.202 -0.049 0.020 -0.655 0.965 0.953 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.391) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
10. contiguity 0.195 0.204 0.225 0.198 -0.042 0.103 -0.142 -0.144 -0.143 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
11. language 0.166 0.266 0.163 0.102 -0.054 -0.072 0.099 0.094 0.052 0.111 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
12. colony 0.229 0.234 0.219 0.154 0.003 -0.005 -0.018 -0.015 -0.029 0.122 0.324 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.890) (0.806) (0.239) (0.408) (0.105) (0.000) (0.000)
13. distance -0.241 -0.139 -0.228 -0.048 -0.033 -0.145 0.104 0.078 0.085 -0.210 0.062 -0.046 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.141) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
14. schengen 0.144 0.127 0.101 0.050 -0.043 0.224 -0.236 -0.200 -0.199 0.196 -0.020 -0.018 -0.243 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.178) (0.222) (0.000)
ln(Inflows Mig) is the logarithm of average inflows of migration in OECD countries between 2008 and 2000
ln(High Mig) is the logarithm of the difference of migration stock for high skilled people between 2000 and 1990
ln(Low Mig) is the logarithm of the difference of migration stock for low skilled people between 2000 and 1990
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Table 6: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
ln(Inflows Mig) 4.404 2.732 3029
ln(High Mig) 4.917 2.567 2824
ln(Low Mig) 4.269 2.604 2164
EPL (differential) 0.041 0.271 2052
Informality (differential) -12.725 16.316 2052
GDP (differential) 15.342 13.798 4470
GDP 80% (differential) 20.692 19.685 3159
GDP 20% (differential) 8.202 7.845 3159
diaspora 1990 0.833 6.21 4312
contiguity 0.02 0.14 4620
common language 0.096 0.295 4620
colony 0.033 0.178 4620
distance 0.699 0.431 4620
schengen 0.039 0.193 4620
ln(Inflows Mig) is the logarithm of average inflows of migration in OECD countries between 2008 and 2000
ln(High Mig) is the logarithm of the difference of migration stock for high skilled people between 2000 and 1990
ln(Low Mig) is the logarithm of the difference of migration stock for low skilled people between 2000 and 1990
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